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ABSTRACT 
 
We consider bargaining problems that involve two participants, with a 
nonempty closed, bounded convex bargaining set of points in the real 
plane representing all realizable bargains. We also assume that there is 
no definite threat or disagreement point that will provide the default 
bargain if the players cannot agree on some point in the bargaining set. 
However, there is a nondeterministic threat: if the players fail to agree 
on a bargain, one of them will be chosen at random with equal 
probability, and that chosen player will select any realizable bargain as 
the solution, subject to a reasonable restriction. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider bargaining problems that involve two participants, with a nonempty closed, 
bounded convex bargaining set of points  representing all realizable bargains. 
That is, to each point corresponds at least one agreement, or bargain, and to each 
realizable bargain there corresponds a unique point in . The coordinates of each point 
represent the utility of that bargain to each of the players. We consider the bargaining 
problem to be equivalent to the selection of some point in  to which both players agree. 
A solution to the bargaining problem is then regarded as any one of the bargains 
corresponding to the selected point. We also assume that there is no definite threat or 
disagreement point d  that will provide the default bargain if the players cannot agree 
on some point in the bargaining set. However, there is a nondeterministic threat: if the 
players fail to agree on a bargain, one of them will be chosen at random with equal 
probability, and that chosen player will select any realizable bargain as the solution, with 
one restriction: there must be no bargain with the same utility to the chosen player, with 
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higher utility to the player not chosen. To put it a different way, if the chosen player can 
increase the utility to the unchosen player at no personal cost by choosing a different 
bargain, the chosen player is required to do so. The possibility of satisfying this criterion 
is assured by the topological compactness of . S
2. APPROACH 
Beginning with the assumption that there exists a solution function that assigns a solution 
 to every bargaining set T , we create a nested diminishing sequence of 
bargaining sets {
( )c T S⊆
} 0n nS ∞=  for which ( ) ( )nc S c S= , and for which 0S S= . We show  
consists of a single point, and argue that this point is the solution to the original 
bargaining set , and any of its corresponding bargains is a solution to the original 
bargaining problem. 
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3. ASSUMPTIONS 
Define . Note that if (( ) the expected value of the threat point for t S S≡ )max ,x y  and 
 are the points in  with maximal abscissa and ordinate, respectively, then ( max,x y ) S
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1max max max max2 2, , , ,t S mid x y x y x x y y= = + + .  
Define ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, ; ,Trim S x y S t S x y≡ ∈ ≤ , where ( ) ( ), ,a b c d≤  means  and 
. 
a c≤
b d≤
We stipulate the following assumptions: 
A1) Given the choice between an expected payoff of x  and a definite payoff 
, the player will choose the former if y x y> , the latter if x y<  and will have no 
preference if x y= . 
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A2) If a bargaining set T  contains a bargaining set  and  is in , then 
. 
S ( )c T S
( ) ( )c T c S=
A3) If { } 0n nT ∞=  is a nested sequence of bargaining sets all having the same 
solution , and ( )0c T ( )lim nn Diameter T→∞  exists and equals zero, then 
. ( ){ }0
0
n
n
c T T
∞
=
=∩
Justification of A1: The players judge a nondeterministic payoff with expected value x  
and a deterministic payoff of value x , as being equally desirable. 
Justification of A2: This is precisely assumption 7 in Nash [1950]. 
Justification of A3: Since ( )lim 0nn Diameter T→∞ =  and 
0
n
n
T
∞
=
≠ ∅∩ , it follows that  
consists of a single point. Since , . 
0
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n
T
∞
=
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n
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∞
=
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4. A PROPOSITION 
Proposition 1: For every bargaining set T , ( ) ( )( )c T c Trim T= . 
Proof: First note that because of A1, the first player will never rationally accept any point 
( ),x y T∈  with abscissa less than that of ( )t T , because in that case the threat scenario 
has a higher expected payoff to the first player than ( ),x y  and can be obtained 
unilaterally by the first player’s refusing to bargain. Similarly, because of A1, the second 
player will never rationally accept any point ( ),x y T∈  with ordinate less than that of 
, because in that case the threat scenario has a higher expected payoff to the second 
player than (
( )t T
),x y  and can be obtained unilaterally by the second player’s refusing to 
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bargain. Therefore, the rationality of the players implies ( ) ( )t T c T≤ . But this just means 
that . Next, since T  contains the set ( ) ( )c T Trim T∈ ( )Trim T  and , by 
A2 we must have 
( ) ( )c T Trim T∈
( ) ( )( )Tc T c Trim= . 
5. A SEQUENCE OF BARGAINING PROBLEMS 
We begin with  and define 20S S= ⊆ \ ( )1n nS Trim S −=  for . First observe that the 
sets produced are themselves nonempty closed, bounded convex set of points. They are 
nonempty because  contains the point 
1n ≥
( 1nS Trim S −= )n ( )1nt S − , so by induction since  
is nonempty, so are all . Since  
0S
nS
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } [ ) [ )( )1 2 1 2, ; , , , ,Trim A x y A t A t t x y A t t= ∈ = ≤ = ∩ ∞ × ∞ , and  
is closed and convex, if  is closed and convex, so is its intersection with [ , 
thus  is closed and convex. Hence by induction since  is closed and convex, 
so are all . Finally, since  for , and  is bounded, so are all . Thus 
each  is a bargaining set. 
[ ) [ )1 2, ,t t∞ × ∞
A ) [ )1 2, ,t t∞ × ∞
( )Trim A 0S
nS 1n nS + ⊆ S 0n ≥ 0S nS
nS
Next, by Proposition 1 we have ( ) ( )( )n nc S c Trim S= , so ( ) ( 1n nc S c S += )  for every 
. By definition we have 0n ≥ ( )1n nS Trim S+ nS= ⊆ , so the { } 0n nS ∞=  are nested. We now 
show that  exists and equals zero. Indeed, for each  for , let ( )lim nn Diameter S→∞ nS 1n ≥ nB  
be the smallest closed box such that . Then we may write nS B⊆ n [ ] [ ], ,n n n n nB a b c d= ×  
for some . If we divide , , ,n n n na b c d ∈\ nB  into four congruent disjoint boxes, it is clear 
that  is a subset of the upper right box ( )1nS Trim S+ = n , ,2 2n n n nn n
a b c db d+ +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤×⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
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Indeed, 1 , ,2 2
n n n n
n n n
a b c dB b d+
+ +⎡ ⎤ ⎡⊆ ×⎢ ⎥ ⎢⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ( )
⎤⎥⎦ , so ( )1
1
2n n
Diameter B Diameter B+ ≤ . Since 
 is compact, 1S ( )1Diameter S  is finite, so is , thus ( )1Diameter B
( ) ( )1 112n nDiameter B Diameter B+ ≤ . Since ( ) (1 1n nDiameter S Diameter B+ +≤ ) , we have 
( ) ( )1 112n nDiameter S Diameter B+ ≤  and thus ( )lim 0nn Diameter S→∞ = . 
Now by A3 we conclude that . The point ( ){ }
0
n
n
c S S
∞
=
=∩ ( )c S , we claim, is the solution 
to the original bargaining set , and any of its corresponding bargains is a solution to the 
original bargaining problem. 
S
6. AN ALGORITHM FOR FINDING THE SOLUTION 
Let [ ] [ ]max max: , ,f x x y y→  be the function such that ( )( ) [ ]{ }max, ; ,t f t t x x∈  is the 
boundary of  lying between and including S ( )max ,x y  and ( )max,x y , as defined earlier. 
Define sequences { } 0n nx ∞= , { } 0n ny ∞= , { } 0n nz ∞= , and { } 0n nw ∞=  satisfying 0x x= , , 
, and , and the recurrences  
0 may y= x
x y0 maz x= 0w =
( )11 2n n nx x z+ = + , ( )( ) ( )11 12n n ny f x z f x+ += + = n , ( )( ) ( )1 111 12n n nz f y w f w− −+ += + = n  
and ( )11 2n nw y+ = + nw  for . Then 0n > ( ) ( ) ( )lim , lim ,n n n nn nc S x y w z→∞ →∞= = . 
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